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SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE: THE SCOPE
OF JUDICIAL RULE MAKING AUTHORITY
IN OHIO
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1933 and 1934 the United States Congress enacted legislation
granting the United States Supreme Court power to make rules gov-
erning procedure in civil cases' and in criminal appeals. 2 In 1934 the
United States Supreme Court promulgated rules of criminal proce-
dure after a plea of guilty or verdict or finding of guilt.' In 1937 the
Court issued the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to govern the
manner of litigation in civil cases in federal courts.' After receiving
statutory authorization,' the United States Supreme Court issued the
Federal Rules of.Criminal Procedure in 1944.6 Many states followed
the federal example, granting state supreme courts authority to make
procedural rules for all state courts.7 Many state courts then promul-
gated procedural rules patterned after the federal rules.8
Ohio, however, was not immediately responsive to the trend of
granting courts rule making authority.9 But with the adoption in 1968
of the Modern Courts Amendments to the Ohio Constitution, 0 the
Ohio Supreme Court was granted rule making power to regulate
procedure within the state court system. Article IV, § 5 (B) of the
Ohio Constitution now provides in part:
Federal Enabling Act ch. 651, §§ 1-2, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), as amended, 28 U.S.C. 2072
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Federal Enabling Act], set out in note I I infra.
2 Act of Feb. 24, 1933, ch. 119, §§ 1-3, 47 Stat. 904, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3772 (1970).
292 U.S. 659 (1934).
308 U.S. 645 (1940).
5 Act of June 29, 1940, ch. 445, 54 Stat. 688, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1970).
5 327 U.S. 821 (1947).
1 Harris, The Rule-Making Power, 2 F.R.D. 67, 68-73 (1943); Joiner & Miller, Rules of
Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55 MICH. L. REv. 623, 625 (1957).
Clark, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1938-1958: Two Decades of the Federal
Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 435 (1958). Clark lists fifteen jurisdictions as having adopted
the Federal Civil Rules "fully" and fourteen more as having adopted "substantial portions" of
the Federal Civil Rules. See also Milligan & Pohlman, The 1968 Modern Courts Amendment
to the Ohio Constitution, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 811, 830 (1968).
9 See Milligan & Pohlman, supra note 8, at 828-31. Ohio by statute adopted some of the
procedural changes incorporated in the federal rules.
11 132 pt. II Ohio Laws 2878 (1967). Amended Substitute House Joint Resolution 42
(107th General Assembly) proposed amending Article IV, §§ I & 2, repealing Article IV, §.§ 3,
4, 7, 8, 10, 12, & 14 and Article II, §§ 12 & 13; and enacting Article IV, §§ 3, 4, 5, & 6.
NOTE
The supreme court shall prescribe rules governing practice and
procedure, in all courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge,
enlarge, or modify any substantive right. . . . All laws in conflict
with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules
have taken effect.
This constitutional provision granting the Ohio Supreme Court rule
making authority is very similar to the Federal Enabling Act adopted
by the Congress granting the United States Supreme Court rule mak-
ing authority in civil cases." Since 1968, the Ohio Supreme Court has
issued rules governing civil procedure, 12 criminal procedure, 3 and
appellate procedure, 4 all patterned after the corresponding federal
rules. 5
In Ohio, as in the federal system, the validity of a court promul-
gated rule may turn on the distinction between "substance" and "pro-
cedure," since the court is allowed to regulate procedure but is not
allowed to abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. 6 If, for
example, the Ohio Supreme Court, in a case involving the validity of
an Ohio rule, decided that the rule abridged a "substantive right,"
then the rule would have to be declared invalid since it exceeded the
court's rule making authority. 7 However, court promulgated rules
have a great presumption of validity." In both Ohio and the federal
11 The Federal Enabling Act stated in part:
ITihe Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to prescribe, by
general rules, for the district courts of the United States and for the courts of the
District of Columbia, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the
practice and procedure in civil actions at law. Said rules shall neither abridge, en-
large, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant. They shall take effect six
months after their promulgations, and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall
be of no further force or effect.
12 22 Ohio St. 2d xvii (1970).
'3 34 Ohio St. 2d xix (1973).
" 26 Ohio App. 2d xvii (1971).
For civil rules, see J. MCCORMAC, OHIO CIVIL RULES PRACTICE iii (1970). For criminal
rules, see I K. APLIN ET AL., ANDERSON'S OHIO CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1.1
(1975); 2 0. SCHROEDER & L. KATZ, OHIO CRIMINAL LAW AND PRACTICE, 117-297 (1974).
For appellate rules, see T. KOYKKA, OHIO APPELLATE PROCESS § 3.05 (1972); A. WHITESIDE,
OHIO APPELLATE PRACTICE, Preface (1972).
" See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941); State v. Hughes, 41 Ohio St. 2d 208,
324 N.E.2d 731 (1975); State ex rel. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Kornowski, 40 Ohio St. 2d 20, 317 N.E.
2d 920 (1974).
" See, e.g. State v. Hughes, 41 Ohio St. 2d 208, 324 N.E.2d 731 (1975); cf. Perry v. Allen,
239 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956).
" See H.F.G. Co. v. Pioneer Publishing Co., 162 F.2d 536, 539 (7th Cir. 1947) in which
the court states that
we are of the view that a strong presumption exists that the Supreme Court in
366 37 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 364 (1976)
system, the rules were drafted by an advisory committee, issued by
the Ohio Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, and
passed upon by the Ohio General Assembly or the Congress. This
process gives court promulgated rules prima facie validity as being
within the scope of the judicial rule making power. t9
In discussing the substantive-procedural distinction, there is a
tendency to portray both "substance" and "procedure" as clearly
defined categories which are mutually exclusive. However, such a
portrayal is inaccurate:0 what is "substance" and what is "proce-
dure" may vary depending on the purpose for making the distinc-
tion. 2' What is "procedural" for purposes of federal diversity jurisdic-
tion or for conflicts of laws may not be "procedural" for purposes
of determining the validity of a court promulgated rule.2 The Ohio
Supreme Court recognized this chameleon-like quality in Gregory v.
Flowers.23 In attempting to use the substantive-procedural distinc-
tion to define the scope of permissible retroactive laws the court
observed that "'[s]ubstantive' and 'procedure' are the same key
words to very different problems. Neither 'substance' nor 'procedure'
represents the same invariants. Each implies different variables de-
pending upon the particular problem for which it is used. ' 24
It has been contended that such nebulous concepts as "sub-
stance" and "procedure" result in an illusory distinction25 and that
the terms should be abandoned.2 6 But since both the Ohio and federal
prescribing the rules acted within the power delegated to it by Congress, and that
the court and Congress, as well as others who labored in connection therewith,
thought that the rule in question was one of procedure and that its adoption would
not affect the substantive rights of the litigant.. Furthermore, we think that the
determination as to whether a mistake has been made in this respect can more
appropriately be made by the Supreme Court, which is given power to amend.
See also Helms v. Richmond-Petersburg Turnpike Authority, 52 F.R.D. 530 (E.D. Va. 1971).
n See J. MCCORMAC, OHIO CIVIL RULES PRACTICE § 1.02, at 4 (1970).
20 Joiner & Miller, supra note 7, at 635; Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control
over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14-
15 (1959).
21 See W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 163-67
(1949).
2 Id.
1 32 Ohio St. 2d 48, 290 N.E.2d 181 (1972).
24 Id. at 57 n.9, 290 N.E.2d at 187 n.9, quoting Frankfurter, J., in Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
2 1 C. CHAMBERLAYNE, EVIDENCE § 171 at 217 (1911) cited in W. CooK, supra note
21, at 158 n.10.
2 Riedl, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power Prescribe Rules of
Evidence? 26 A.B.A.J. 601, 604 (1940). See also Note, The Rulemaking Power of the Florida
Supreme Court: The Twilight Zone Between Substance and Procedure, 24 U. FLA. L. REV.
87, 100 (1971).
NOTE
courts have continued to use this distinction as the test for determin-
ing the validity of court promulgated rules" (as well as for other
purposes),28 the concepts of "substance" and "procedure" must be
examined and defined as clearly as possible .2  In this discussion, an
understanding of the substantive-procedural distinction is sought only
for the purpose of determining the validity of a court made rule.
No specific formula or definition exists which would clearly de-
lineate between "substance" and "procedure" in every case.3 1 It may
be more realistic to visualize some things being classified as "substan-
tive," some as "procedural," and some as falling into a "twilight
zone.""1 A difference in the definition of "substance" and "proce-
dure" could lead to a difference in the outcome of cases, but it should
also be noted that courts in different jurisdictions using the same
definition of "substance" and "procedure" may arrive at different
results in similar cases.3
The importance of the substantive-procedural distinction in
Ohio has been illustrated in the recent case of State v. Hughes.33
There the Ohio Supreme Court relied on the substantive-procedural
distinction in Article IV, § 5 (B) of the Ohio Constitution to declare
part of a court promulgated rule invalid. A portion of Ohio Appellate
Rule 4 (B) was held to exceed the court's rule making authority. Since
it was granted rule making authority in 1968, the Ohio Supreme
Court has promulgated five sets of rules governing procedure in the
courts of Ohio.34 Hughes is apparently the first case where any rule
2' See note 16 supra.
11 See W. CooK, supra note 21.
2 See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 20, at 15, 20.
11 Southwest Underwriters v. Montoya, 80 N.M. 107, 109, 452 P.2d 176, 178 (1969);
Curd, Substance and Procedure in Rule Making, 51 W. VA. L.Q. 34, 45 (1948).
11 Note, The Rulemaking Power of the Florida Supreme Court: The Twilight Zone
Between Substance and Procedure, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 87 (1971).
2 See State v. Hughes, 41 Ohio St. 2d 208, 324 N.E.2d 731 (1975); State v. Birmingham,
95 Ariz. 310, 390 P.2d 103, modified, 96 Ariz. 109, 392 P.2d 775 (1964), both discussed in text
infra. The definition of substance and procedure need not be the same in every jurisdiction. In
states where the legislature plays a role in the rule making process, "procedure" could be
defined more broadly to include a wider range of subjects. In jurisdictions where the legislature
plays no role in the rule making process and cannot invalidate rules, "procedure" could be
defined more narrowly to include a smaller range of subjects. See Note, The Rule-Making
Powers of the Illinois Supreme Court, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 903, 904-5 (1965).
41 Ohio St. 2d 208, 324 N.E.2d 731 (1975).
3' OHIO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 22 Ohio St. 2d xvii (1970); OHIO RULES OF APPEL-
LATE PROCEDURE, 26 Ohio App. 2d xvii (1971); OHIO RULES OF JUVENILE PROCEDURE, 30
Ohio St. 2d xix (1972); OHIO RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 34 Ohio St. 2d xix (1973); OHIO
COURT OF CLAIMS RULES, 42 Ohio St. 2d xxv (1975). OHIO TRAFFIC RULES, 40 Ohio St. 2d
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so issued has been invalidated.
This note will place Hughes ivithin the context of previous Ohio
cases concerning the validity of court promulgated rules. Hughes will
be used as a vehicle for understanding the limits of the court's rule
making power, and will be compared with prior Ohio and federal
cases defining "substance" and "procedure" in a search for consist-
ency in definition and result. The Ohio experience in Hughes will be
compared with the judicial approaches in Florida and Arizona. Both
of these states use the substantive-procedural distinction to define the
limits of the court's rule making authority,35 and both have proce-
dural rules based in large part upon the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure,36 as does Ohio.3 7 Florida has held that the right of appeal was
substantive and that a court rule changing the right of appeal to a
discretionary one was invalid. Arizona also held that the right of
appeal was substantive, but stated that the manner in which an appeal
can be taken was procedural.
An alternative basis for the decision in Hughes is that Ohio
Appellate Rule 4 (B) unconstitutionally expanded the jurisdiction of
the court of appeals. Pursuant to Article IV, § 3 (B) of the Ohio
Constitution, the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals is within the
exclusive province of the legislature. The effect of the Hughes deci-
sion on other rules will be examined. Finally, the scope of the Ohio
Supreme Court's rule making authority will be analyzed and com-
pared with the role of the Ohio General Assembly in regulating judi-
cial procedure.
II. THE VALIDITY OF COURT MADE RULES: "SUBSTANCE" AND
"PROCEDURE" IN DIFFERENT JURISDICTIONS
A. Hughes and the Ohio Experience
James Hughes was arrested in Green Township by an off-duty
xvii (1975), were promulgated pursuant to authority granted by Omo REV. CODE ANN..§
2935.17 and 2937.46 (Page 1975).
35 For Arizona, see State v. Birmingham, 95 Ariz. 310, 390 P.2d 103, modified, 96 Ariz.
109, 392 P.2d 775 (1964); Heat Pump Equip. Co. v. Glen Alden Corp., 93 Ariz. 361, 380 P.2d
1016 (1963). For Florida, see In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65 (1973)
(concurring opinion); State v. Garcia, 229 So. 2d 236 (1969); State v. Furen, 118 So. 2d 6
(1960); In re Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n for Promulgation of New Fla. R. Civ. Proc.,
145 Fla. 223, 199 So. 57 (1940); Note, The Rulemaking Power of the Florida Supreme Court:
The Twilight Zone Between Substance and Procedure, 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 87 (1971); Nash,
Florida Appeal Times, 16 U. MIAri L. REV. 24, 39-43 (1961).
" See Clark, supra note 8.
7 See note 15 supra.
NOTE
Delphi Township police officer. Hughes refused to submit to the
arrest and was charged with resisting arrest and assault on a law
enforcement officer. The Hamilton County Municipal Court granted
Hughes' motion to quash the warrants on the grounds that the officer
was beyond his jurisdiction when the arrest was made and the officer
did not have a warrant. The prosecution filed a notice of appeal but
the appeal was dismissed for failure to seek permission from the court
of appeals to file a bill of exceptions as required by Revised Code §
2945.68.8 The prosecution appealed this dismissal to the Ohio
Supreme Court, contending that § 2945.68 was superseded by Ohio
Appellate Rule 4 (B), 9 which grants the prosecution an appeal as
of right, requiring only that a notice of appeal be filed.
The prosecution argued that §§ 2945.68 and 2945.70 were proce-
dural in nature and, since they were in conflict with a court promul-
gated rule, were superseded by the rule. The prosecution contended
that § 2945.7040 was the sole source of the state's right to appeal.4
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.68 (Page 1975) states:
The prosecuting attorney, solicitor, or the attorney general may present a bill
of exceptions in a criminal action to the court of appeals or the supreme court and
apply for permission to file it with the clerk of the court for the decision of such court
upon the points presented therein. Prior thereto, he shall give reasonable notice to
the judge who presided at the trial in which such bill was taken, of his purpose to
make such application. If the court of appeals or the supreme court allows the bill
to be filed, the prosecuting attorney, solicitor, or attorney general shall, within ten
days of the filing of the bill, file his brief in support of such exceptions and forthwith
serve a copy thereof upon the trial judge and any attorney appointed by the judge to
argue the exceptions against the prosecuting attorney, solicitor, or the attorney
general.
31 The pertinent part of Ohio Appellate Rule 4 (B) states:
APPEAL AS OF RIGHT-WHEN TAKEN
(B) Appeals in criminal cases. . . In an appeal by the prosecution, the notice of
appeal shall be filed in the trial court within thirty days of the date of the entry of
the judgment or order appealed from; provided that in appeals under Criminal Rule
12(J) and Juvenile Rule 22(F) the notice of appeal shall be filed with the clerk of
the trial court within seven days of the date of the entry of the judgment or order
appealed from . ...
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.70 (Page 1975) reads as follows:
If the court of appeals or the supreme court is of the opinion that the questions
presented by a bill of exceptions should be decided, it shall allow the bill of exceptions
to be filed and render a decision thereon. This decision shall not affect the judgment
of the trial court in said cause, nor shall said judgment of the trial court be reversed,
unless the judgment of the court of appeals or the supreme court reverses the judg-
ment of the trial court on its ruling on a motion to quash, a plea in abatement, a
demurrer, a motion to suppress evidence, or a motion in arrest of judgment. In all
other cases the decision of the court of appeals or the supreme court shall determine
the law to govern in a similar case.
" Brief for Appellant at 2, State v. Hughes, 41 Ohio St. 2d 208 (1975).
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The last sentence of § 2945.702 was designed to allow courts of
appeals to give opinions which would govern only in future cases.
This part of the statute allowing opinions on moot questions was
declared unconstitutional in City of Euclid v. Heaton43 since it ex-
ceeded the constitutional grant of jurisdictional authority to the court
of appeals. The prosecution reasoned that since the part of § 2945.70
allowing advisory opinions was rendered unconstitutional, the re-
mainder of §§ 2945.68 and 2945.70, argued by the prosecution to
merely implement the last sentence by allowing the courts to screen
which appeals they will hear, should be discarded also.45 The prosecu-
tion further reasoned that since §§ 2945.68 and 2945.70 were the
procedural devices for implementing the appeal and were in conflict
with Ohio Appellate Rule 4 (B), the rule superceded the statute.
Article IV, § 5 (B) of the Ohio Constitution provides that "[a]ll laws
in conflict with such [court promulgated] rules shall be of no further
force or effect after such rules have taken effect."
The court in Hughes rejected the prosecution's argument that §
2945.68 was procedural and held that the statute created a substan-
tive right of appeal for the prosecution. 6 Since the statute was sub-
stantive, Ohio Appellate Rule 4 (B), which was in conflict, acted to
abridge or enlarge a substantive right and was invalid as exceeding
the Ohio Supreme Court's rule making authority.4 7
In an earlier decision, Krause v. State," the Ohio Supreme
Court dealt with the meaning of "substantive right" as used in Article
IV, § 5 (B) of the Ohio Constitution." The court said "substantive"
is used in "contradistinction to the words 'adjective' or 'procedural'
which pertain to the method of enforcing rights or obtaining re-
dress."5 The court went on to define "siubstantive" as "that body of
law which creates, defines and regulates the rights of the parties. (See
42 The last sentence of OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.70 (Page 1975) reads as follows: "In
all other cases the decision of the court of appeals or the supreme court shall determine the
law to govern in a similar case."
15 Ohio St. 2d 65, 238 N.E.2d 790 (1968).
"OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 3.
Brief of Appellant at 3-4, which states in part: "As that entire part of Section 2945.70
has been declared unconstitutional, the screening procedure must also be discarded as obsolete
baggage."
11 41 Ohio St. 2d 208, 209-10, 324 N.E.2d 731, 732-33 (1975).
,7 Id. at 211; 324 N.E.2d at 733.
" 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736 (1972).
, OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5 (B) is set out in the text supra following note 10.
" Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 145, 285 N.E.2d 736, 744 (1972).
NOTE
Black's Law Dictionary.) The word substantive refers to common
law, statutory and constitutionally recognized rights."'
The majority in Hughes did not cite to Krause or any other
judicial precedent for a definition of "substantive right." Indeed, the
court seemed to be stating a conclusion without offering any explana-
tion. The court simply said:
R.C. 2945.68, however, grants the prosecution a substantive
right of appeal which did not exist at common law prior to the
adoption of. . . Section 3 of Article IV. . . , and the implementing
legislation contained in R.C. 2945.67 through 2945.70 ...
The effect of R.C. 2945.67 through 2945.70 is to grant jurisdic-
tion to appellate courts to hear appeals by the prosecution in crimi-
nal cases and to create a substantive right in the prosecution to bring
such appeals .... 12
Justice Herbert, in his dissenting opinion, said that the court did
not follow the definition of substantive right found in Krause: "the
provisions of R.C. 2945.68 do not create, define or regulate the rights
of any party." 5 The dissent said that although the statute does
"represent a legislative effort to describe certain procedural 'rights',
which purport to pertain to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court . . . I find no substantive right of any party" affected by the
statute.54 Justice Herbert questioned whether the majority was pre-
pared to strike down the thirty-day filing time for notice of appeal in
civil cases found in Appellate Rule 4 (A)5" since it "enlarged" the
twenty-day filing time previously permitted by statute.56
Justice Herbert's question was answered quickly when the Ohio
Supreme Court rendered its decision in State v. Wallace." Again
confronted with the issue it faced in Hughes, the court reaffirmed its
opinion in Hughes, saying that "[slubstantively, the right [of the state
to appeal in a criminal case] does not exist except upon the allowance
11 Id. The Ohio Supreme Court is not the only court to refer to Black's Law Dictionary
for a definition of "substantive". See Schultz v. Gosselink, 148 N.W.2d 434, 436 (Iowa 1967).
52 State v. Hughes, 41 Ohio St. 2d 208, 210-211,324 N.E.2d 731, 733 (1975) (emphasis in
original).
Id. at 211, 324 N.E.2d at 734.
5' Id. at 211-12, 324 N.E.2d at 734.
Ohio Appellate Rule 4 (A) states in pertinent part: "In a civil case the notice of appeal
required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within thirty days of the date
of the entry of the judgment or order appealed from .. "
State v. Hughes, 41 Ohio St. 2d 208, 212, 324 N.E.2d 731, 734 (1975).
' 43 Ohio St. 2d I, 330 N.E.2d 697 (1975).
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of leave to appeal by the appellate court. 5 8 The court then held that
the motion for leave to appeal by the state in a criminal case was
governed by the procedural requirements of Appellate Rule 559 and
the time requirements of Appellate Rule 4 (B).1° The court said that
"[f]airness demands that a motion by the state for leave to appeal be
filed within a reasonable time after the entry of judgment or the order
appealed from. Because the time limits in App. R. 4 (B) meet that
objective, we make them applicable to such appeals."'" It appears, in
answer to Justice Herbert's question, that the court was not prepared
to strike down the many alterations from statutory filing times made
by the rules as an unconstitutional enlargement of the right to appeal.
Although the majority in Hughes did not cite any case law to
support its decision, at least two Ohio appellate courts had previously
considered cases which were relevent to the question in Hughes. In
Columbus v. Youngquist,l2 the Franklin County Court of Appeals
had directly faced the Hughes issue: whether Revised Code §
2945.68, requiring the permission of the court of appeals to file an
appeal, was superseded by the Ohio Appellate Rules, allowing an
appeal as of right. In Youngquist, the court held that § 2945.68 was
procedural in nature and was superseded by the Ohio Appellate
Rules.63 The court closely examined the Ohio Appellate Rules to
insure that a conflict existed between the rules and the statute. 64
However, no explanation was given as to why the statute was proce-
dural in nature.
Id. at 2; 350 N.E.2d at 698.
" The court said in State v. Wallace, 43 Ohio St.'2d 1, 3, 330 N.E.2d 697, 698 (1975),
that Appellate Rule 5, when applied to appeals by the prosecution, may properly be restated
to read:
[In an appeal by the state in a criminal case,] a motion for leave to appeal shall be
filed with the Court of Appeals. . .setting forth the errors which the movant claims
to have occurred in the proceedings of the trial court. The motions shall be accompa-
nied by affidavits, or by such part of the record upon which the movant relies, to
show the probability that the errors claimed did in fact occur, and by a brief or
memorandum of law in support of the movant's claims. Concurrently with the filing
of the motion the movant shall file with the clerk of the trial court a notice of appeal
in the form prescribed by Rule 3 and file a copy of the notice of appeal in the Court
of Appeals. The movant shall also furnish a copy of his motion and a copy of the
notice of appeal and a copy of the motion for leave to appeal upon the attorney for
the [defendant], who may, within thirty days from the filing of the motion, file such
affidavits, parts of the record and brief or memorandum of law to refute the claims
of the movant [brackets and omissions by court].
" Appellate Rule 4 (B) is set out in note 39 supra.
dl State v. Wallace, 43 Ohio St. 2d 1, 3-4, 330 N.E.2d 697, 699 (1975).
e 33 Ohio App. 2d 317, 294 N.E.2d 910 (1972).
6 Id.
11 Id. at 319-20; 294 N.E.2d at 912.
NOTE
The Court of Appeals for Hamilton County in Hughes distin-
guished Youngquist on the facts. The court held that the Youngquist
language saying that Ohio Appellate Rule 4 (B) controlled over §
2945.68 was dicta, since both a notice of appeal and an application
to file a bill of exceptions were filed in Youngquist. 5 The court also
stated that the Youngquist decision was purely interlocutory and not
a "final judgment." Hughes was not in conflict with the judgment in
Youngquist since the Youngquist decision was not a "judgment."6
In Moore v. Van Wert Propane, Inc.,67 the Court of Appeals for
Van Wert County discussed the jurisdiction of a court to hear an
appeal from a decision by the Ohio Industrial Commission. In its
discussion, the court labeled the right of appeal a substantive right,
although no explanation was given."8
B. The Federal Experience
The result reached by the court in Hughes may have been differ-
ent if the case had been tried in the federal court system. In Sibbach
v. Wilson & Co.,9 the United States Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether Rule 3570 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
violated the Federal Enabling Act.71 The petitioner argued that "sub-
stantive rights" means "important" or "substantial" rights and that
even a procedural rule abridging, enlarging, or modifying a substan-
tial right should be invalidated 2.7 The Court rejected this argument,
saying the test for the validity of a federal rule is whether it regulates
"substance" or "procedure". The Court defined procedure as "the
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substan-
tive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard
State v. Hughes, Nos. C73151, 73152 (1st App. Dist. Nov. 1973) at 2.
I d. at 1.
17 34 Ohio App. 2d 187, 297 N.E.2d 548 (1973).
Id. at 188, 297 N.E.2d at 549.
:9 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
7 FED. R. Civ. P. 35 at that time stated in pertinent part:
In an action in which the mental or physical condition of a party is in controversy,
the court in which the action is pending may order him to submit to a physical or
mental examination by a physician. The order may be made only on motion for good
cause shown and upon notice to the party to be examined and to all other parties
and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination
and the person or persons by whom it is to be made.
71 Federal Enabling Act ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), as amended, 28 U.S.C. 2072 (1970),
set out in note II supra.
72 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 11 (1941).
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or infraction of them."7 The Court implied that "substantive right"
referred to the cause of action sued upon-in Sibbach, the right "not
to be injured in one's person by another's negligence ... "I'
The Supreme Court again discussed the distinction between sub-
stantive and procedural rights in Mississippi Publishing Corp. v.
Murphree7 5 Although most alterations of procedure do affect the
rights of the litigants, the Court said such incidental effects are not
what is meant by "substantive right" as used in the Federal Enabling
Act.7 The Court held that although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4 (f,77 allowing service of process anywhere within a state, would
affect petitioner's rights, it "does not operate to abridge, enlarge or
modify the rules of decision by which that court will adjudicate its
rights. 78
In 1965 in Hanna v. Plumer,79 the United States Supreme Court
reaffirmed that the Sibbach test was to be applied under the Federal
Enabling Act to distinguish between substance and procedure and,
thus, to decide the validity of any federal rule. "[I]n cases adjudicat-
ing the validity of Federal Rules, we. . .have to this day continued
to decide questions concerning the scope of the Enabling Act and the
constitutionality of specific Federal Rules in light of the distinction
set forth in Sibbach.' 80
The federal and Ohio definitions of substance and procedure are
similar, yet the results of their application have been different.
Hughes held part of Ohio Appellate Rule 4 (B) invalid, but Federal
Appellate Rule 4 (B)81 which provides a similar procedure,82 still has
" Id. at 14.
I, d. at 13.
75 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
11 Id. at 445.
" The relevant portion of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f) reads as follows: "All
process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state
in which the district court is held. .. ."
7' Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1945).
79 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
Id. at 470-71.
81 Federal Appellate Rule 4(b) states in relevant part:
APPEAL AS OF RIGHT-WHEN TAKEN
(b) Appeals in Criminal Cases. . . .When an appeal by the government is author-
ized by statute, the notice of appeal shall be filed in the district court within 30 days
after the entry of the judgment or order appealed from. A judgment or order is
entered within the meaning of this subdivision when it is entered in the criminal
docket.
Appeals by the government are authorized by statute from decisions dismissing one or
NOTE
the presumption of validity.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, when confronted with a
situation analogous to Hughes, reached a result opposite to that of
the Ohio court. In Semel v. United States, 3 the federal appellate
court held that Federal Criminal Rule 37 (a)(1)," allowing an appeal
as of right and abolishing petitions for allowance of appeal, con-
trolled over a statute"5 which gave the appellate court control over the
allowance of an appeal. The conflict between the statute and the rule
was established"8 but there was no discussion of the substantive-
procedural distinction. The court without explanation concluded that
if the statute and rule are in conflict, the rule controls. No mention
was made of such a change affecting the jurisdiction of the court of
appeals.8 7
C. The Florida and Arizona Approaches
Courts in Florida and Arizona have decided the validity of court
promulgated rules by looking to the substantive-procedural distinc-
tion. In State v. Furen,8 the Florida Supreme Court confronted the
mirror image of the issue in Hughes. Furen involved a conflict be-
tween a statutory grant of appeal as a matter of right8" and a court
more counts in an indictment or information and from decisions suppressing or excluding
evidence or requiring the return of seized property. 18 U.S.C. 3731 (1970).
11 See 6 W. MILLIGAN, OHIO FORMS OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE CA4-3, 4-6 (1975).
158 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1946).
' Federal Criminal Rule 37(a)(1) is now incorporated within Federal Appellate Rule 3.
At the time of Semel, Federal Criminal Rule 37(a)(1) read in pertinent part:
An appeal permitted by law from a district court to the Supreme Court or to a circuit
court of appeals is taken by filing with the clerk of the district court a notice of appeal
in duplicate. Petitions for allowance of appeal, citations and assignments of error in
cases governed by these rules are abolished.
" Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 132, 36 Stat. I134 which provides:
Any judge of a circuit court of appeals, in respect of cases brought or to be brought
before that court, shall have the same powers and duties as to allowances of appeals
and the conditions of such allowances as by law belong to the justices or judges in
respect of other courts of the United States, respectively.
The Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as issued in 1938 state that Rule
73 is intended to supersede this statute.
" Semel v. United States, 158 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1946).
" For a discussion of how the Ohio court viewed the issue of modifying jurisdiction in the
Hughes decision, see text infra beginning at note 103.
118 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1960).
Laws of Florida 1947 ch. 24090, § 9, at, 1028, which reads in pertinent part:
The defendant may appeal from a final order of the [real estate] commission to the
circuit court of the county from which he applied for registration, if an applicant,
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rule making all such appeals discretionary." The court relied on a
definition of "practice" used by the English Court of Appeal in 1881:
"Practice," in its larger sense . . . like "procedure" . . . denotes
the mode of proceeding by which a legal right is enforced, as distin-
guished from the law which gives or defines that right, and which
by means of the proceeding the Court is to administer,-the machi-
nery as distinguished from its product.'
In applying its definition, the Florida court held that the distinc-
tion between appeal as of right and appeal on leave of court is more
than a difference in form.9" The court concluded that the rule was
more than procedural: "The rule exceeds the scope of 'practice and
procedure,' is legislative in character and must yield to the provisions
of the statute. The substantive rights under the statute are greater
than under the rule. ' 93
The Arizona Supreme Court considered the validity of court
promulgated rules in State v. Birmingham94 by looking to the
substantive-procedural distinction. There an appeal was taken by the
state from an order enjoining enforcement of a statute allowing the
highway department to revoke drivers' licenses.99 The trial court
judge did not sign a written judgment but only an entry order making
permanent the temporary restraining order. Rule 58 of the Arizona
Rules of Civil Procedure requires all judgments to be in writing,
signed by a judge, and provides that judgments are not effective until
filed with the clerk. 9 The court held that despite noncompliance with
and registration has been denied, or, if the defendant is a registrant and his registra-
tion has been revoked or suspended, the county from which the records of the
commission show him to be registered at the time the information is filed.
Legislation enacted by the Florida General Assembly in 1959 (but not applicable to pend-
ing cases) amends the statute to permit appeals only upon writ of certiorari. Laws of Florida
1959, ch. 59-197, § 4, at 364.
11 FLA. App. R. 4.1 states: "All appellate review of the rulings of any commission or board
shall be by certiorari as provided by the Florida Appellate Rules."
1, State v. Furen, 118 So. 2d 6, 12 (1960), quoting Poyser v. Minors, 7 Q.B.D. 329, 333
(1881). For a discussion of this English case, see Joinder & Miller, supra note 7, at 631-32.
92 State v. Furen, 118 So. 2d 6, 12 (1960).
93 Id.
" 95 Ariz. 310, 390 P.2d 103, modified, 96 Ariz. 109, 392 P.2d 775 (1964).
Laws of Arizona 1959, ch. 142, § 2.
" Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a) provides:
All judgments shall be in writing and signed by a judge or a court commissioner duly
authorized to do so. The filing with the clerk of the judgment constitutes entry of
such judgment, and the judgment is not effective before such entry. The entry of the
judgment shall not be delayed for taxing costs.
NOTE
rule 58, it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal since the statute defining
which judgments and orders were appealable controlled over rule
58.17 The statute granting the right to appeal was labeled "substan-
tive,"98 although no definition of "substantive" or "procedural" was
given.
However, on rehearing, the Arizona Supreme Court retreated
from this holding.9 The court said that although the right to appeal
was substantive, "the manner in which the right may be exercised is
subject to control through the use of procedural rules."1 10 The statute
designated those instances where a right to appeal existed and rule
58 described the manner in which a court must act to create an
appealable order or judgment. The court thus concluded the rule was
procedural and did not enlarge or diminish any substantive right of
appeal given by the statute. The court held rule 58 valid, requiring
compliance before an appeal could be taken. 101
In its opinion on rehearing, the Arizona court used language
very similar to that of the Ohio court in Krause in defining
"substantive" and "procedural":
Uniformly, the substantive law is that part of the law which
creates, defines and regulates rights; whereas the adjective, remedial
or procedural law is that which prescribes the method of enforcing
the right or obtaining redress for its invasion. It is often said the
adjective law pertains to and prescribes the practice, method, proce-
dure or legal machinery by which the substantive law is enforced or
made effective." 2
D. Ohio Adopts Course Similar to Florida Approach
The Ohio Supreme Court had several different alternatives
available when it decided Hughes. The court could have followed the
federal approach, saying the statute was procedural and superseded
by the rule. Semel would be authority for such an approach. The Ohio
Supreme Court could have adopted the Arizona approach, holding
that the right of appeal was substantive, but that the manner in which
" State v. Birmingham, 95 Ariz. 310, 316, 390 P.2d 103, 107 (1964).
"Id.
" 96 Ariz. 109, 392 P.2d 775 (1964).
"0 Id. at 110, 392 P.2d at 776.
"' Id. at 112-13, 392 P.2d at 777.
I02 d. at 110, 392 P.2d at 776 (citations omitted).
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the appeal would be taken was procedural. Birmingham would be
legal precedent for such a course of action. Instead, the Ohio court
adopted the approach taken by Florida, holding that the statute was
substantive and therefore the conflicting rule was invalid. However,
the court failed to cite any legal precedent to support its holding. By
taking an expansive view of "substantive right", the court has nar-
rowed the ambit of "procedure". By doing so, the court has also
narrowed the scope of its rule making authority.
III. CHANGE OF JURISDICTION AS AN ADDITIONAL BASIS FOR
Hughes
The majority in Hughes made several references to the change
in the jurisdiction of appellate courts that would result if Ohio Appel-
late Rule 4 (B) were followed. According to the court, Revised Code
§§ 2945.67 through 2945.7010 grant jurisdiction to appellate courts
to hear appeals by the prosecution in criminal cases. 04 The court
intimated that the rule modified the jurisdiction granted by the stat-
ute: "App. R. 4 (B), in providing an appeal as of right by the prosecu-
tion, enlarges the statutory right of appeal provided by R. C. 2945.67
through 2945.70 and abridges the right of appellate courts to exercise
their discretion in allowing such appeals."' 5
If the court were concerned that Ohio Appellate Rule 4 (B)
changed the jurisdiction of appellate courts, it could have based its
decision in Hughes on the inability of the court to expand or limit
jurisdiction through its rule making power. Numerous federal and
state courts have held that they have no power to change jurisdiction
through court promulgated rules.100
103 OHIO REV. CODE §2945.68 is set out in note 38 supra. OHIO REV. CODE §2945.70
is set out in note 40 supra. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.69 (Page 1975) reads as follows:
The trial judge may appoint some competent attorney to argue the bill of exceptions
against the prosecuting attorney, solicitor, or the attorney general under section
2945.68 of the Revised Code, and such appointee shall receive for his services a fee
of not more than one hundred dollars, to be fixed by the judge and paid out of the
treasury of the county in which the bill was taken. Such attorney shall file his brief
against the prosecuting attorney, solicitor, or the attorney general within ten days
after service upon him of the brief in support of said exceptions. The hearing of such
cases shall have precedence of other business and such cases shall be continued upon
the docket of the court of appeals or the supreme court until argued and submitted.
104 State v. Hughes, 41 Ohio St. 2d 208, 210, 324 N.E.2d 731, 733 (1975).
105 Id. at 211, 324 N.E.2d at 733.
106 United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941), Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S.
1 (1941). See Annot., 110 A.L.R. 22 (1937), 158 A.L.R. 705 (1945); 7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 82.02 (2d ed. 1975).
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Article IV, § 3 of the Ohio Constitution can be viewed to bar the
courts' expansion of their jurisdiction through their rule making
power. The relevant portion of that constitutional provision states
that "[clourts of appeals shall have such jurisdiction as may be pro-
vided by law . . ." Although Justice Herbert, in his dissent in
Hughes, hypothesized that this provision could be construed to allow
a change of jurisdiction via court made rules,10 7 the section could
more easily be construed to mean that courts of appeals have only
such jurisdiction as granted by statutory enactment of the Ohio
General Assembly." 8
IV. THE EFFECT OF Hughes ON OTHER RULES
The decision in Hughes, viewed from either the substantive right
or jurisdictional rationales, may have an impact on the validity of
other court made rules. Two rules that could be directly affected are
Ohio Criminal Rule 12 (J)'" and Ohio Juvenile Rule 22(F),110 both
of which involve the state's right to appeal upon the granting of a
motion to suppress evidence. These rules give the state an appeal as
of right when, in addition to filing a notice of appeal, the prosecution
certifies both that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay
and that the granting of the motion has rendered the state's proof so
weak that any reasonable possibility of effective prosecution is de-"
' State v. Hughes, 41 Ohio St. 2d 208, 212, 324 N.E.2d 731, 734 (1975).
1,8 See OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION, STAFF RESEARCH REPORT No. 75,
PROBLEMS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 72 (1965). The comments to the joint resolution
proposed by the Study Committee on Judicial Administration indicate that jurisdiction "as
established by law" is equivalent to "as established by act of the General Assembly."
t" Ohio Criminal Rule 12 (J) reads in pertinent part asfollows:
The state may take an appeal as of right from the granting of a motion for the
return of seized property, or from the granting of a motion to suppress evidence if,
in addition to filing a notice of appeal, the prosecuting attorney certifies that: (1)
the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay; and (2) the granting of the motion
has rendered the state's proof with respect to the pending charge so weak in its
entirety that any reasonable possibility of effective prosecution has been destroyed.
Such appeal shall not be allowed unless the notice of appeal and the certification
by the prosecuting attorney are filed with the clerk of the trial court within seven
days after the date of the entry of the judgment or order granting the motion. Any
appeal taken under this rule shall be diligently prosecuted.
" Ohio Juvenile Rule 22 (F) states in part:
In delinquency proceedings the state may take an appeal as of right from the
granting of a motion to suppress evidence if, in addition to filing a notice of appeal,
the prosecuting attorney certifies that (1) the appeal is not taken for the purpose of
delay and (2) the granting of the motion has rendered proof available to the state so
weak in its entirety that any reasonable possibility of proving the complaint's allega-
tions has been destroyed.
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stroyed. However, Revised Code §§ 2945.67 through 2945.70 allow an
appeal by the state only at the discretion of the appellate court."'
These rules would seem to present the same issue as the court faced
in Hughes and logically demand the same result, i.e., a declaration
of their invalidity. In cases where the Ohio Supreme Court has con-
strued Ohio Criminal Rule 12 (J), no indication was given that the
rule might be invalid." 2 But the issue of the validity of Criminal Rule
12(J) and Juvenile Rule 22 (F) has never been directly faced by the
court.
If it is valid to assume that the change of jurisdiction by court
made rule could have been an alternative ground for the holding in
Hughes, then it would be possible to question the validity of a rule if
it enlarged or restricted jurisdiction. Ohio Appellate Rule 2,"' which
abolishes appeals on questions of law and fact, could be attacked as
impinging on the appellate jurisdiction of the court. Before the appel-
late rules were promulgated, at least ten sections of the Ohio Revised
Code attempted to govern, to some degree, appeals on questions of
law and fact.' The most important, Ohio Revised Code § 2501.02
(B), confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals to hear questions of
law and fact in enumerated classes of actions, e.g., actions seeking
construction of a trust, the foreclosure of mortgages, specific per-
formance of contracts, and injunctions." 5 After Appellate Rule 2
I State v. Wallace, 43 Ohio St. 2d 1, 330 N.E.2d 697 (1975); State v. Hughes, 41 Ohio
St. 2d 208, 324 N.E.2d 731 (1975).
112 State v. Caltrider, 43 Ohio St. 2d 157, 331 N.E.2d 710 (1975); State v. Mitchell, 42
OhiowSt. 2d 447, 329 N.E.2d 682 (1975). But see State v. Brown, 45 Ohio App. 2d 76, 79,
341 N.E.2d 325, 327 (1976) (concurring opinion), which applied the reasoning of Hughes to
Criminal Rule 12 (J) and held that § 2945.68 through 2945.70, granting courts discretion as
to appeals, controlled over the rule.
"3 Ohio Appellate Rule 2 states: "Appeals on questions of law and fact are abolished."
" OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1921.02 (appeals from county courts); 2101.42 (appeals from
probate divisions); 2501.02(B) (classes of cases appealable on law and fact); 2505.01 (C) (defini-
tion); 2505.03 (reference on appeals on questions of law and fact from judgments of county
courts); 2505.05 (designations of type of appeal in notice of appeal); 2505.06 (bond in appeals
on law and fact); 2505.21 (hearing de novo and procedure on appeal); 2505.23 (jurisdiction to
entertain and transform to appeals on questions of law); 2505.33 (costs on appeals on law and
fact). See 6 W. MILLIGAN, OHIO FORMS OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE CA2-1 (1975).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2501.02(B) (Page Supp. 1975) states in part:
Upon an appeal on questions of law and fact the court of appeals in cases arising
in courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district, shall weigh
the evidence and render such judgment or decree as the trial court could and should
have rendered upon the original trial of the case, in the following classes of actions,
seeking as a primary and paramount relief:
NOTE
became effective, the presumption was that appeals on questions of
law and fact no longer existed, but all appeals had to be on questions
of law. This rule can be viewed as taking away the power of the
appellate courts granted by statute to resolve issues of fact. Although
the Ohio Supreme Court has not ruled on its validity, Ohio Appellate
Rule 2 was held valid by the Court of Appeals for Darke County. In
Shilt v. Irelan,"I the appellate court said the rule superseded Revised
Code § 1921.02,117 one of the sections allowing appeals on questions
of law and fact from a judgment of a county court.
V. THE LEGISLATURE'S ROLE IN JUDICIAL RULE MAKING
The role in rule making assigned to the legislature varies greatly
among the states 18 In New Jersey the legislature has no formal role
in fashioning court promulgated rules."' Any prior or subsequent
conflicting statute is superseded by the rule. In Missouri, the rule
making power of the court is limited by subject matter, e.g., rules
cannot change the law relating to juries or the right of appeal.120 In
addition, any rule may be repealed or amended by an enactment of
the legislature limited to that purpose. In the federal system, pro-
posed rules are submitted to Congress for examination and become
effective if no action of disapproval is taken within ninety days. 2'
However, Congress has the ultimate power over the practice and
procedure of federal courts.12
(3) The foreclosure of mortgages and marshalling of liens, including statutory liens.
(8) The quieting of title to property, the partition of property, and the registration
of land titles ...
... 40 Ohio App. 2d 578, 321 N.E.2d 621 (1974).
"' Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 1921.02 (Page Supp. 1975) states, "[wjhen an appeal is taken
from a judgment of a judge of a county court, the plaintiff in the action before the county court
judge is the plaintiff in such court, and in all respects, the parties must proceed as if the action
originally had been commenced in that court."
"I Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 20, at 6 n.36; Note, The Rule-Making Powers of
the Illinois Supreme Court, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 903, 905-07 (1965).
" N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2 3 directs the Supreme Court to make rules "governing the
administration of all courts in the State and, subject to law, the practice and procedure in
all such courts." In Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240,74 A.2d 406 (1950), the court interpreted
"subject to law" to mean subject to substantive law and held that its rule making power was
not subject to overriding legislation. For a stimulating discussion of this case, see Kaplan &
Greene, The Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rule-Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v.
Salisbury, 65 HARv. L. REv. 234 (1951) and Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New
Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REV. 28 (1952).
... MO. CONsT. art. V, § 5.
121 18 U.S.C. 3771 (1970); 28 U.S.C. 2072 (1970).
"I Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941). See C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 44 n.129
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In Ohio, the role of the legislature in the issuance of court rules
is similar to that of Congress in the federal system in that the General
Assembly has a veto power over the rules before they become effec-
tive. Article IV, § 5 (B) of the Ohio Constitution provides in part:
[P]roposed rules shall be filed by the court, not later than the fif-
teenth day of January, with the clerk of each house of the general
assembly during a regular session thereof, and amendments to any
such proposed rules may be so filed not later than the first day of
May in that session. Such rules shall take effect on the following
first day of July, unless prior to such day the general assembly
adopts a concurrent resolution of disapproval ...
In Ohio, however, the legislative branch does not have the ultimate
power over the practice and procedure of Ohio courts.'23 The respon-
sibility for judicial procedure is placed, by the Ohio Constitution,
with the Ohio Supreme Court, and the power of the General Assem-
bly is limited to that of a veto. 24 Once a rule becomes effective, the
General Assembly has no power to amend or repeal it and any con-
flicting statute is of no effect. Article IV, § 5 (B) of the Ohio Consti-
tuion says that "[a]ll laws in conflict with such [court promulgated]
rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken
effect."
In recognition of the supreme court's authority, the 108th Gen-
eral Assembly in 1970 repealed many statutes invalidated by the Ohio
Rules of Civil Procedure. 25 However in 1975 the 111 th General As-
sembly, in enacting a medical malpractice bill, attempted to change
by statute what would be included in a complaint in a medical mal-
practice suit. The statute, Revised Code § 2307.42, requires such a
complaint to contain
(A) A statement of the facts constituting the cause of action in
ordinary and concise language;
(2d ed. J947).
"2 See Milligan & Pohlman, supra note 8, at 829.
124 Id.
" 133 Ohio Laws 3017. Section 3 of the act provides:
That the taking effect of the Rules of Civil Procedure on July 1, 1970, is prima-facie
evidence that the sections of the Revised Code to be repealed by Section I are in
conflict with such rules and shall have no further force or effect, . . . unless a court
shall determine that one of such sections, or some part thereof, has clearly not been
superseded by such rules and that in the absence of such section or part thereof being
effective, there would be no applicable standard of procedure prescribed by either
statutory law or rule of court. The failure to repeal or amend any other section
establishes no evidence concerning its conflict with such rules.
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(B) A listing of all benefits of any kind paid or payable to the
claimant from any source... ;
(C) A demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader
claims he is entitled, except that the amount of relief in damages
thereof shall not be stated. [emphasis added].
The statute is in conflict with Ohio Civil Rule 8 (a) which requires a
pleading to contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for judgment for
the relief to which he deems himself entitled." From the language of
Art. IV, § 5 (B), it seems certain that the General Assembly cannot
change a procedural matter by statute where a court promulgated
rule is in force. In the procedural area, the rule controls over the
statute. When faced with the conflict, the Ohio Supreme Court would
almost certainly invalidate § 2307.42.
Many reasons support such a grant of rule making power to the
court. The judiciary, as the branch of the government responsible for
judicial administration in the public eye should have the authority to
effectively regulate procedure. 126 Both the legislature and judiciary
should be responsible for their own procedural operations.in The
court is more familiar with its procedural problems and can take
action to rectify them.12 1
Placing rule making authority in the court allows procedural
requirements to be more flexible in application and more responsive
to change. 29 The application of procedural statutes can become in-
flexible and result in injustice. While courts were bound by the stat-
utes and action of the legislature was required to change them, rule
making authority allows the courts to respond more quickly to proce-
dural problems.
Finally, the legislature is subject to political pressures which may
not have the efficient administration of justice as their objective. 3 '
Giving the court rule making power helps remove judicial procedure
from a highly political arena.
121 See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 20, at 10.
I" See Pound, The Rule-Making Power of Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599, 601 (1926).
,21 See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 20, at 11.
,29 Joiner & Miller, supra note 7, at 642-43; Pound, supra note 127, at 602.
"' See Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REV. 28, 44
(1952).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Although Ohio and other states have followed the trend of grant-
ing courts rule making authority, the scope of this authority has
varied depending upon the definition of substance and procedure in
each state. What is procedural in one state may be considered sub-
stantive in another. There could be a beneficial aspect to this varia-
tion: in jurisdictions where the legislature has power to override court
made rules, procedure could be defined more broadly than in jurisdic-
tions where the judiciary has no checks on its rule making author-
ity.'31
In Hughes the Ohio Supreme Court took a broader view of what
was substantive than what the federal or some other state courts
might have taken. 32 As a result of Hughes, prosecutors taking an
appeal in a criminal case 33 will have to file a bill of exceptions
rather than a notice of appeal. The appeal is a matter of discretion
with the court, not as of right, as proposed by the rules.
Hughes can be viewed as the advent of a more cautious approach
by the Ohio Supreme Court toward its rule making authority. The
court should carefully scrutinize proposed rules to insure that they do
not exceed the court's authority, since areas of legitimate legislative
interest lie within the "twilight zone" between substance and proce-
dure.'34 The Ohio Supreme Court should recognize that its rule mak-
ing power is on a different level than that of the United States Su-
preme Court: the Congress can ultimately override any rule promul-
gated by the Court since the Court's rule making-power is based on
a legislative grant of authority. 5 In Ohio, the Ohio General Assem-
bly cannot override any valid court made rule since the state court's
"I See Note, The Rule-Making Powers of the Illinois Supreme Court, 1965 U. ILL. L.F.
903, 904 (1965).
"3 See text beginning after note 102 supra.
'3 Appeal by the prosecution in a criminal case is rather limited. OHIo REVIsED CODE
ANN. § 2945.70 (Page 1975) permits a prosecutorial appeal for rulings of a trial court on a
motion to quash, a plea in abatement, a demurrer, a motion to suppress evidence, or a motion
in arrest of judgment. Ohio Criminal Rule 12 (A) abolishes all pleas not specifically enumer-
ated; demurrers, a plea in abatement, and amotion to quash are abolished and replaced with
a motion to dismiss. Ohio Criminal Rule 12 (J) allows the state to appeal a ruling on a motion
to suppress evidence or a motion to return property. See discussion of Ohio Criminal Rule 12
(J) in text beginning at note 109 supra.
" Joiner & Miller, supra note 7 at 644-53 discuss specific phases of judicial administra-
tion and whether there is a legitimate legislative interest involved. See also, Peterson, Rule
Making in Colorado: An Unheralded Crisis in Procedural Reform, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 137,
163-64 (1966).
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rule making authority derives from the Ohio Constitution, not the
legislature.
On the other hand, the aforementioned reasons for allowing
judicial rule making are sound. 36 The progress made in procedural
reform under court made rules should continue. Hughes, the one self-
confessed instance of rule making excess, must not be used to justify
any further narrowing of the court's rule making authority.
The court in State v. Wallace"7 had the opportunity to retreat
from its decision in Hughes but declined to do so. Instead, Hughes
was reaffirmed and the procedural requirements of Appellate Rule 5
were applied to prosecutorial appeals. Thus, it appears that the
Hughes decision and its effects will be with us for many years to
come.
W. Glenn Forrester
'3 Cf. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure are Void Constitutionally,
23 ILL. L. REv. 276 (1928).
,31 See text beginning after note 126 supra.
131 43 Ohio St. 2d 1, 330 N.E.2d 697 (1975).
